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ABSTRACT
New-generation vaccines against typhoid fever have the potential to reduce the burden of disease in areas 
where the disease is endemic. The case for public expenditure on typhoid Vi polysaccharide vaccines for two 
low-income, high-incidence slums (Narkeldanga and Tiljala) in Kolkata, India, was examined. Three meas-
ures of the economic benefits of the vaccines were used: private and public cost-of-illness (COI) avoided; 
avoided COI plus mortality risk-reduction benefits; and willingness-to-pay (WTP) derived from stated pref-
erence (contingent valuation) studies conducted in Tiljala in 2004. Benefits and costs were examined from 
a social perspective. The study represents a unique opportunity to evaluate typhoid-vaccine programmes 
using a wealth of new site-specific epidemiological and economic data. Three typhoid-vaccination strate-
gies (targeting only enrolled school children, targeting all children, and targeting adults and children) 
would most likely pass a social cost-benefit test, unless  benefits are restricted to include only avoided COI. 
All three strategies would be considered ‘very cost-effective’ using the standard comparisons of cost per 
disability-adjusted life-year avoided with per-capita gross domestic product. However, at an average total 
cost per immunized person of ~US$ 1.1, a typhoid-vaccination programme  would absorb a sixth of exist-
ing public-sector spending on health (on a per-capita basis) in India. Because there appears to be significant 
private economic demand for typhoid vaccines, the Government could design a financially-sustainable 
programme with user-fees. The results show that a programme where adults pay a higher fee to subsidize 
vaccines for children (who have higher incidence) would avoid more cases than a uniform user-fee and still 
achieve revenue-neutrality.
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INTRODUCTION
Many new-generation vaccines against important 
‘neglected’ diseases are in various stages of the pipe-
line of discovery, testing, and large-scale manufac-
turing. Vaccines against many diseases, e.g. malar-
ia, HIV, and shigellosis, are still under development 
while other new vaccines, e.g. rotavirus, Hib conju-
gate, and pneumococcal conjugate vaccines, have 
been licensed but have yet to be widely incorporat-
ed into national immunization programmes. Mod-
ern vaccines have also been developed for diseases 
against which first-generation vaccines existed, e.g. 
cholera and typhoid, but which had either poor ef-
ficacy in preventing the diseases, short periods of 
protection, and/or unacceptable levels of side-
effects. These new-generation vaccines have the 
potential to produce large reductions in the bur-
den of diseases among the poorest sub-populations 
worldwide. Vaccination is also a powerful tool for 
preserving the efficacy of existing pharmaceutical 
treatments in the face of growing microbial resist-
ance, i.e. to antibiotics, artemisinin for malaria, etc.
In evaluating investments in a new or improved 
vaccine, we focus on three related economic ques-
tions. First, would a programme that provided vac-
cines at no charge to users pass a social cost-benefit 
test? A second related question is whether the vac-
cine is a wise use of scarce public-sector health re-
sources. An investment may pass a social cost-bene-Cook J et al. Typhoid vaccination in Kolkata
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fit test and still not be a wise use of public resources 
if the public-sector budget is constrained, and there 
are other, even better investments. Finally, if a vac-
cine passes these thresholds, how can it be financed 
in practice? This last question is perhaps the more 
pressing in vaccine policy in the poorest countries. 
Policy analysts have typically evaluated the cost 
impact of introducing a single new vaccine into a 
country’s immunization schedule (see Ref. 1 and 2 
for two recent examples) but have paid less atten-
tion to the cumulative financial impact of adding 
all of these new vaccines simultaneously.
User-fees in the healthcare sector are controver-
sial, particularly for immunizations. Consideration 
of user-fees raises difficult issues of how to protect 
the poor, how to avoid corruption and theft when 
money changes hands, how to incorporate po-
tential herd-protection effects in vaccine pricing 
(3), and whether the administrative costs of 
levying fees outweigh their financial benefits. 
A financially-sustainable programme may not 
be feasible where demand for the vaccine is low. 
Vaccination programmes without user-fees may 
be possible for these new vaccines if public-sector 
health spending increases substantially, and/or if 
donors show expanded and sustained support for 
fully subsidizing mass vaccinations rather than for 
R&D and demonstration projects. Otherwise, many 
developing countries will face a difficult choice. 
They can either continue with policies that effec-
tively ensure that new vaccines are unavailable to 
anyone, or promote vaccination strategies that in-
corporate user-fees.  
We report here on an economic analysis of vaccina-
tion against typhoid fever using the Vi polysaccha-
ride vaccine in two impoverished slums in Kolkata, 
India. Typhoid fever, caused by the bacterium Salmo-
nella enterica serovar Typhi, is transmitted through 
contaminated food or water and characterized by 
high fever, chills, nausea, headache, and malaise, 
sometimes with delirium (4). The global burden 
of typhoid fever was estimated at 21 million cases 
and more than 200,000 deaths in 2000, although 
true incidence is most likely higher because of in-
adequate surveillance and under-reporting. South 
and Southeast Asia is believed to have the highest 
incidence rates (5). The Vi polysaccharide vaccine, 
given as an injection, requires only one dose (4). 
The best available estimates indicate that the Vi 
vaccine is safe and 65% protective, with protection 
lasting  at least three years (6-8). This vaccine is in-
ternationally licensed for children aged two years 
and above (9,10).
There are relatively few published economic eval-
uations of typhoid-vaccination programmes. Pa-
padimitropoulos et al. examined the cost-effective-
ness of two types (Ty21a and Vi polysaccharide) of 
typhoid vaccines for travellers (11). They found 
that neither vaccine was cost-effective unless trav-
ellers were visiting areas with very high incidence 
rates (200 cases per million travellers) or expected to 
be in very close personal contact with local inhabit-
ants. Under a range of vaccine-cost estimates, how-
ever, Poulos et al. found that immunizing preschool 
children against typhoid fever in a high-incidence 
urban slum in Delhi would actually be cost-saving 
to the public sector (12). They also found that im-
munizing other age-groups would likely pass a so-
cial cost-benefit test when privately-borne cost-of-
illness were counted as benefits of vaccination.
This previous work on the economic attractiveness 
of typhoid-vaccination programmes can be greatly 
enriched using the results of recent research from 
the Diseases of the Most Impoverished (DOMI) 
Programme. The DOMI programme, administered 
by the International Vaccine Institute in South Ko-
rea and funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foun-
dation, involved a number of parallel activities, 
including epidemiological studies, economic stud-
ies, and investigation of the feasibility of vaccine-
technology transfer. Using a contingent valuation 
approach (discussed in more detail below) in Hue, 
Viet Nam, Canh et al. found that the private bene-
fits that would accrue to the average household in 
Hue (with 5.6 household members), if all house-
hold members received a Vi vaccine, ranged from 
US$ 21 to US$ 27 (13). They found that a vacci-
nation programme without user-fees would most 
likely pass a social cost-benefit test but that there 
was also significant potential for the programme to 
be self-financing through user-fees. Cook et al. used 
DOMI data from four sites in Asia (North Jakarta, 
Indonesia; Hue, Viet Nam; Karachi, Pakistan; and 
the same two Kolkata slums examined in this pa-
per) to examine the cost-effectiveness of typhoid 
Vi vaccination programmes (14). They found that 
programmes targeting either children or both chil-
dren and adults were ‘very cost-effective’ in Kara-
chi, Kolkata, and North Jakarta but not in Hue.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Analysis approach
Although we include results from this parallel cost-
effectiveness analysis (14), we focus here on a social 
cost-benefit criterion that is less commonly used in 
the economic evaluation of vaccines. Do the total Cook J et al. Typhoid vaccination in Kolkata
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economic benefits of a publicly-provided typhoid-
vaccination programme or strategy (i.e. without 
user-charges) exceed the total economic costs? (For 
more background on social benefit-cost analysis, 
see Ref.15 or 16).
We examined three different types of vaccination 
strategies. All three types of strategies are cam-
paigns; we assume that the vaccinations will not 
be folded into a routine infant-vaccination pro-
gramme, such as Expanded Programme on Immu-
nization (EPI) because (a) like other polysaccharide 
vaccines, the Vi vaccine is not licensed for children 
aged less than two years, and (b) the incidence 
is higher in older children. The first school-based 
strategy (we will denote it as strategy ‘S’) would tar-
get only children aged 5-14 years actually attending 
school. The second school-based strategy (strategy 
‘C’) would target all children, less than 15 years, 
who are old enough to receive the vaccine safely 
(>2 years). We assume that parents or caretakers 
would bring unenrolled children to the school for 
vaccination. The third type of strategy would tar-
get adults as well as all eligible children and would 
require a community-based vaccination campaign 
(strategy ‘CA’ for children and adults). For all three 
vaccination strategies, we assume a one-period 
model, i.e. we estimate the costs of immunizing the 
target population in year 1 and compare these costs 
with the effects on the burden of disease over the 
duration of the vaccine’s effectiveness (3 years).
We use three definitions of economic benefits. The 
first definition includes only the privately- and 
publicly-borne cost-of-illness (COI) avoided as a 
result of the vaccination strategy. This is the most 
commonly-used measure in social benefit-cost 
analyses of vaccination programmes. The sec-
ond definition adds the value of reducing mortali-
ty risk (the chance of dying from typhoid fever) 
through a value-of-statistical-life (VSL) calculation. 
By measuring or observing how people trade mon-
ey for changes in their risks of dying (for example, 
by buying bicycle helmets or demanding higher 
wages for risky jobs), one can calculate the average 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) of society to avoid risks 
that will result on average in one less death in a 
population (a ‘statistical’ life). VSL calculations do 
not attempt to place an economic value on the life 
of any particular person. Although the risk of dying 
from typhoid fever may be low in Kolkata, these 
benefits may be quite important to people at risk of 
getting typhoid fever. In a contingent valuation 
survey of cholera vaccines in Beira, Mozambique, 
55% of respondents said that the most important 
benefit of the vaccine was reducing their risk of dy-
ing (17).  
The third definition of economic benefits is based on 
the WTP
 observed in studies using the contingent 
valuation methodology in one of the two neigh-
bourhoods we evaluated. ‘Willingness-to-pay’ refers 
to the total economic value that a person places on 
a good or service, or the area under the private de-
mand curve less expenditure on the goods or serv-
ice. For a vaccine with no user-charge, WTP repre-
sents the total economic benefits that accrue to the 
person from receiving the free vaccine. These WTP 
estimates should be the most comprehensive meas-
ure of the economic benefits of vaccination, assum-
ing that respondents were thinking about avoiding 
potential typhoid-treatment costs, lowering the risk 
of dying for themselves and their household mem-
bers, and other benefits which are more difficult to 
quantify in the first two definitions (pain and suf-
fering, fear, risk aversion, etc.). Since one would not 
expect individuals’ private valuations to include 
publicly-borne treatment cost, we add this to these 
stated preference estimates of WTP for our third 
definition of economic benefits.
The economic cost of a typhoid-vaccination strate-
gy is composed of three main components: (a) the 
cost of acquiring vaccines from the manufacturer, 
(b) the cost of delivering and administering the 
vaccine to the target population, and (c) the time 
and pecuniary costs incurred by household mem-
bers to travel to the vaccination outpost and to 
wait to receive the vaccine. For each of the three 
economic bene-fit measures, we subtract the total 
economic costs to calculate net benefits. We refer 
to these measures of net benefits as ‘avoided COI 
net benefits’, ‘VSL+avoided COI net benefits’, and 
‘WTP+avoided public COI net benefits’. Table 1 
summarizes the three measures [The online appen-
dix (http://www.icddrb.org/jhpn) provides more 
details on how they are calculated].
We examine the sensitivity of our results in two 
ways. First, we find the value of the most impor-
tant parameters which would produce exactly zero 
net benefits, i.e. the programme or strategy would 
‘breakeven’. Second, we allow the parameters to 
vary simultaneously in a Monte Carlo framework. 
We used Crystal Ball, a plug-in from Oracle for MS 
Excel, to run the simulations. The results presented 
used 10,000 draws from triangular parameter distri-
butions for all variables, with low and high ends of 
the distribution set to the uncertainty ranges and 
the peak of the triangle set to the mean value. Cook J et al. Typhoid vaccination in Kolkata
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Table 1. Definitions of social net benefit measures
Name Definition
Avoided COI net benefits [Cases avoided * (private+public COI per case)]
  – (acquisition costs+delivery costs+travel and time costs)
VSL+avoided COI net benefits [Cases avoided * (private+public COI per case)] 
  + (deaths avoided * value of statistical life)
  – (acquisition costs+delivery costs+travel and time costs)
WTP+avoided public COI net 
benefits
(Willingness-to-pay per person for vaccine) 
  + (cases avoided * public COI per case)
  – (acquisition costs+delivery costs+travel and time costs)
COI=Cost-of-illness; VSL=Value-of-statistical-life; WTP=Willingness-to-pay
Study site
Kolkata (formerly Calcutta) is the third largest city 
in India, with a population of 4.6 million in the 
city proper and approximately 13 million in the 
greater metropolitan area (18). Of the 4.6 million 
people, approximately 1.5 million currently reside 
in slums (both officially recognized and unofficial) 
(18). Our focus was on two Kolkata slums—Tiljala 
and Narkeldanga—where we carried out economic 
and epidemiological field studies in 2004. With a 
combined population of 185,000 living in approxi-
mately five sq km, Tiljala and Narkeldanga are very 
densely-crowded areas. Both are highly impover-
ished: per-capita daily income is approximately 
US$ 0.40. Over 90% of the sample in Tiljala lived 
on less than US$ 1 per capita per day, and no one 
had a per-capita income over US$ 3 per day. 
Parameters
Epidemiology
The baseline epidemiology comes from an 11-
month passive surveillance study of typhoid cases 
in Narkeldanga conducted in advance of a typhoid 
vaccine-demonstration project (19). Ochiai et al. 
observed 122 blood culture-confirmed typhoid 
cases in 12 months in the census population of 
57,000, yielding typhoid incidence rates of 3.4, 
4.9, and 1.2 cases per 1,000 population for young 
children aged 2-4 years, school children aged 5-15 
years, and adults (aged 16+ years) respectively (Ta-
ble 2). Since blood-culture tests for typhoid fever 
are only around 50% sensitive (5), we followed 
Crump et al. (5) and Ochiai et al. (19) and doubled 
these observed incidence rates.
We used 65% as the base case for vaccine efficacy, 
ranging from 55% to 75% in the uncertainty analy-
sis (9,10). Although indirect (herd) protection may 
reduce cases even further, we included only direct 
protection in our analysis because empirical evi-
dence of herd protection from typhoid vaccination 
was not available in the published literature at the 
time of writing (these became available as this arti-
cle was in press, see Ref. 20). We assumed that the 
duration of the vaccine’s protection is three years 
(9,10).  
According to the World Health Organization 
(WHO), the case-fatality rate (CFR) for typhoid 
cases treated with antibiotics is about 1% (21). The 
CFR without treatment can range from 4% to 10% 
(21). The CFR in a January 2005 outbreak in Congo 
was 0.5% (214 deaths in 42,564 cases), although 
it is unclear what level of treatment these patients 
received (22). Crump et al. used 1% based on “con-
servative estimates from hospital-based typhoid 
fever studies, mortality data from countries with 
reliable national typhoid fever surveillance systems 
that employ blood culture confirmation of cases, 
and expert opinion” (5). Parry et al. also cited 1% as 
a good estimate (4). Accordingly, we used a CFR of 
1% as our base case estimate, with lower and upper 
bounds of 0.5-3% for uncertainty analysis.   
Parry et al. reported a range of ‘mean fever clear-
ance times’ with different antibiotics from four to 
seven days, increasing to a mean of nine days in 
‘clinical failures’ or cases where antimicrobials were 
not initially successful (4). Treatment times can in-
crease to 21 days if third-line antibiotics, e.g. cepha-
losporins, are necessary (4). We assumed that the 
average typhoid case lasts for one week, with lower 
and upper bounds of four days and three weeks   
respectively.
In the cost-effectiveness calculations, we use a mean 
disability-adjusted life-year (DALY) weight of 0.27, 
which lies within a range of weights for somewhat 
similar diseases (malaria, Japanese encephalitis, 
dengue, and upper respiratory infections) (23). The 
lower and upper bounds are those for dengue fever 
(0.08) and neurological sequelae of malaria (0.47).Cook J et al. Typhoid vaccination in Kolkata
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Table 2. Parameter assumptions for Tiljala and Narkeldanga neighbourhoods of Kolkata, India
Site characteristics Base case value
Uncertainty 
range 
Source
Total population (Tiljala and Narkeldanga) 185,000 24
Children aged <1 year  2 24
Children aged 1-4 year(s) (% of population) 7 24
Children aged 5-14 years (% of population) 20 24
Adults aged 15+ years (% of population) 72 24
Epidemiology
    Incidence per 1,000: children aged 0-1.9 year(s) 0.9 0.16-5.0 19
    Incidence per 1,000: children aged 2-4.9 years 3.4 1.9-6.3 19
    Incidence per 1,000: children aged 5-14.9 years 4.9 4.0-6.7 19
    Incidence per 1,000: adults aged 15+ years 1.2 0.94-1.6 19
    Blood culture sensitivity multiplier 2 19
    Case-fatality rate (%) 1.0 0.5-3 4,5,21
    DALY weight 0.27 0.08-0.47 See text, 23
    Average duration (days) of case  7 4-21 4
Vaccine characteristics and costs
   Effectiveness (%) 65 55-75 9,10
   Duration (years) 3 9,10
   Manufacturing cost (US$) per dose 0.57 0.4-0.8 Lauria and Stewart
   Delivery cost (US$) per dose 0.50 0.3-2.5 Lauria and Stewart
   Travel/time cost (US$) per dose 0.06 Author’s calculation
Cost-of-illness (US$)
   Private COI children aged <15 years 11.7 6-18 Poulos et al.
   Private COI adults aged  >15 years 11.7 6-18 Poulos et al.
   Public COI children aged <15 years 4.3 2-6 Poulos et al.
   Public COI adults aged >15 years 4.3 2-6 Poulos et al.
Demand/benefit measures 
   % who would take if free: children aged 2-4 years  73 58-88 25
   % who would take if free: children aged 5-14 years 69 55-83 25
   % who would take if free: adults aged 15+ years  62 50-74 25
   Slope of demand curve: children aged 2-4 years -0.14 -0.11 to -0.17 25
   Slope of demand curve: children aged 5-14 years -0.27 -0.21  to -0.32 25
   Slope of demand curve: children aged 15+ years  -0.28 -0.22 to -0.34 25
   Per vaccine WTP (US$): children aged 2-4 years 5.2 4.2-6.3 25
   Per vaccine WTP (US$): children aged 5-14 years 2.6 2.1-3.1 25
   Per vaccine WTP (US$): adults aged 15+ years  2.2 1.8-2.7 25
Other parameters
   % of population who hear of programme 80 26,27
   School enrollment rate (%) 69 28
   Discount rate (%) 3 29
   VSL (US$) young children (aged <5 years) 50,000 25k-75k 30, Maskery et al.
   VSL (US$) school-age children (aged 5-14 years) 50,000 25k-75k 30, Maskery et al.
   VSL (US$) adults (aged 15+ years) 50,000 25k-75k 30, Maskery et al.
All currency values are in US$ as of 2007, translated from local currency using market exchange rates
COI=Cost-of-illness; DALY=Disability-adjusted life-year; VSL=Value-of-statistical-life; WTP=Willingness-to-pay   
References for Lauria and Stewart, Poulos et al., and Maskery et al. are provided in the body of the textCook J et al. Typhoid vaccination in Kolkata
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Cost-of-illness
Culture-positive patients from the surveillance 
were invited to participate in a private COI study 
[Poulos C. et al. Cost of illness due to typhoid fever 
in five Asian countries. 2008. (Unpublished working 
paper)]. Interviewers visited patients at home 7, 14, 
and 90 days after the onset of illness. For child cases, 
parents or caretakers were interviewed. A standard-
ized questionnaire measured both direct costs (out-
of-pocket expenditure on fees, medicines, tests, 
transportation, etc.) and indirect costs (lost wages 
and monetized productivity losses, including those 
for patients, caregivers and their substitutes). The 
authors found that the mean private COI (direct 
and indirect) was US$ 11.7 per case.
Data on publicly-borne COI are based on a micro-
costing (i.e. bottom-up) study of treating 16 hos-
pitalized and 67 outpatient cases at two public 
hospitals in Kolkata [Poulos C et al. Cost of illness 
due to typhoid fever in five Asian countries. 2008. 
(Unpublished working paper)]. The public treatment 
costs (provider treatment costs minus patients’ pay-
ments) for hospitalized and non-hospitalized cases 
were, respectively, US$ 100 and US$ 2 in Kolkata. 
Hospitalization rates for adult and child cases were 
2% and 1% respectively. We use an average public 
COI, weighed by hospitalization rate, of US$ 4.3 
per case. For both public and private COI, we use 
values that are 50% lower or higher than the base 
case estimate for the sensitivity analysis.
Willingness-to-pay
The estimates of private demand came from a con-
tingent valuation study carried out in Tiljala in 
2004 (25). These household surveys began with 
questions to respondents about vaccination and ty-
phoid fever. Respondents were then presented with 
a description of a hypothetical typhoid vaccine 
that had the characteristics most similar to the real 
typhoid Vi vaccine (65% effective for three years). 
Respondents were told in 2004 that the vaccine 
would be 70% effective. New research appearing 
since that fieldwork has revised the estimate down-
wards somewhat, to 65%. We used 65% in calculat-
ing programme effects. The interviewer then asked 
respondents whether they would purchase a vac-
cine for themselves and for other household mem-
bers if the price were one of four randomly pre- 
assigned prices. The median WTP per person was 
US$ 5.2, $ 2.6, and $ 2.2 (in 2007) for young chil-
dren, school-age children, and adults respectively 
(More details on the private demand studies and 
the  demand  functions  used  in  our  analysis  are 
available in the online appendix and in Ref. 25).
Vaccine costs
None of the three cost components—acquisition 
costs, delivery costs, and travel/time costs—is 
known with certainty; they depend on a number 
of factors for which there is little information in 
the published literature on vaccine cost. We relied 
on data collected on vaccination costs during the 
Vi demonstration projects in the DOMI study sites 
and a recent review and analysis of this literature 
by Lauria and Stewart [Lauria D and Stewart J. 
Vaccination costs. 2007. UNC Department of Envi-
ronmental Sciences and Engineering (Unpublished 
manuscript)]. We assumed that costs could be cap-
tured in a constant marginal cost measure (a com-
mon assumption in the literature on vaccine evalu-
ation),  rather  than  attempt  to  estimate  fixed 
and variable costs. We assumed that the total mar-
ginal economic cost of providing a typhoid vaccine   
was US$ 1.11 per dose (in 2007 $), comprising: (a) a 
cost to acquire the vaccine (including shipping and 
wastage) of US$ 0.57 per dose, (b) a cost to deliver 
the vaccine of US$ 0.5 per dose, and (c) a travel/
time cost to recipients of US$ 0.06 per dose.
Other parameters
We used the most recent data for India from the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (28) on the net enrollment rate 
(Table 2), or the percentage of school-age children 
who are actually attending school, to calculate the 
total number of school-age children who might be 
vaccinated in the first strategy (strategy ‘S’). Since 
the age-group (5-15 years) spans both primary and 
secondary schools, we used the average of the rates 
of enrollment in primary and secondary schools in 
the model.
Estimates of VSLs are now available for a number of 
less-developed countries. We used a VSL of US$ 
50,000 extrapolated primarily from two recent 
studies in Delhi, India (30) and Matlab, Bangladesh 
(Maskery B et al. An estimate of the economic 
value parents in rural Bangladesh place on ex ante 
risk reductions for their children. 2008. Presented 
at 16th Annual Conference of the European As-
sociation of Environmental and Resource Econo-
mists). More details are available in the online ap-
pendix at http://www.icddrb.org/jhpn. Since the 
VSL estimates are controversial, we also examined 
the sensitivity of our results to a range of estimates 
(again, 50% lower and higher).Cook J et al. Typhoid vaccination in Kolkata
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RESULTS
Base case analysis
In the absence of any Vi vaccination strategy, we 
would expect 2,250 typhoid cases to occur among 
the population of 185,000 (1,300 cases among chil-
dren aged less than 15 years, and 950 cases among 
adults) over three years (Table 3). With a CFR of 
1%, we would anticipate 23 deaths over three years 
due to typhoid fever. We expect that a community-
based strategy that charged no user-fees (strategy 
CoAo in Table 3, where the superscript numbers de-
note a user-fee of zero) would vaccinate approxi-
mately half of the population. This is because we 
assumed that only 80% of the population heard 
about the programme through an information and 
Table 3. Effects of typhoid-vaccination strategies with no user-fees
Impacts
S
0
Enrolled school 
children        
(5-14.9 years)
C
0
All eligible 
children 
(2-15 years)
C
0A
0
Adults plus 
all eligible  
children
No. of vaccinations  (% of age-group) 13,781 (55) 25,373 (56) 89,702 (48)
No. of cases (without→with vaccination) 1,071→808 1,260→807 2,249→1,495
No. of deaths (without→with vaccination) 11→8 13→8 22→15
DALYs (without→with vaccination) 296→223 349→317 581→374
Reduction in burden of disease from baseline (%)* 25 36 35
Total financial costs (US$) of vaccination 14,745 27,149 95,981
Travel/time costs (US$) 0 699 4,578
Total social costs (US$) of vaccination  14,745  27,848  100,559 
Average cost (US$) per person  1.07  1.11  1.12 
Public COI avoided (US$) 1,086  1,871  3,113 
Financial cost less public COI avoided (US$) 13,659 25,278 92,868
Private COI avoided (US$) 2,988  5,145  8,561 
Social cost benefit
Avoided COI net benefits
(Total COI avoided-total costs)
(10,671) (20,832) (88,885)
VSL+avoided COI net benefits 
(VSL+public COI avoided+private COI avoided-total 
costs)
117,204  199,397  277,531 
WTP+avoided public COI net benefits 
(WTP benefits+public COI avoided-total costs)
21,848  53,627  124,499 
Cost-effectiveness (US$)
Net social cost per DALY avoided 147  166  454 
Arrows indicate change from baseline to levels with the vaccination strategy. All currency values are in 
US$ as of 2007, translated from local currency using market exchange rates; *Reduction in baseline bur-
den among the age-group targeted. In strategy S
0, the reduction is calculated from the baseline burden 
of all school-age children, both enrolled and unenrolled; COI=Cost-of-illness; DALY=Disability-adjusted 
life-year; VSL=Value-of-statistical-life
public-health advocacy campaign and because not 
everyone who heard of the campaign will choose 
to be vaccinated (based on our private demand 
estimates from the contingent valuation survey). 
This would reduce the burden of disease by 35% 
(recall also that the Vi vaccine is about 65% ef-
fective). Targeting only children in the two slums 
(strategy C0) would require fewer financial resources 
than including adults (US$ 27,149 vs US$ 95,981). 
The savings to the public-health sector from not 
treating typhoid cases (US$ 1,871 for Co and US$ 
3,113 for CoAo) is much less than the costs of either 
vaccination strategy.
Using the most common definition of economic 
benefits in the literature on health policy that in-Cook J et al. Typhoid vaccination in Kolkata
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cludes only avoided treatment costs (avoided COI 
net benefits), none of the three strategies would 
pass a social cost-benefit test (Table 3, row 13). If we 
incorporate the benefits of mortality-risk reduction 
(through a VSL calculation) or take respondents’ 
stated WTP as the measure of benefits, all three 
strategies would, however, pass (row 14 and 15). 
Using a cost-effectiveness (CE) approach, the three 
strategies have net social costs per DALY avoided of 
US$ 147, US$ 166, and US$ 454 respectively (Table 
3 and Ref. 14). All three would be considered ‘very 
cost-effective’: the ratios are less than per-capita 
gross domestic product (GDP, US$ 871 in India in 
2007).
Sensitivity analysis
We first examined parameters individually to find 
the ‘break-even’ value that equates economic ben-
efits and costs. Recall that, using the avoided COI 
net benefits measure, none of the strategies pro-
duced net benefits. To break even using the COI 
net benefit measure, incidence or total COI would 
need to be 4-8 times higher than observed (Table 
4). Alternatively, the vaccine would have to have a 
much lower average cost than we assumed to break 
even using the avoided COI net benefit measure. 
For the community-based strategy (C0A0) to pass, 
the Government would need to be confident that 
Table 4. Parameter values at which a vaccination strategy would produce zero net benefits
Parameter
S0
School-age  
children 
(5-14.9 years)
C0
All eligible 
children 
(2-14.9 years)
C0A0
Adults plus all 
eligible  
children
Net benefits: avoided COI
   Incidence (per 1,000), or
   total (public+private) COI (US$)
3.6x 4.0x 8.6x
   Total financial vaccine cost (US$) 0.30 0.25 0.08
Net benefits: VSL+avoided COI
   Incidence (per 1,000) 0.11x 0.12x 0.27x
   Case-fatality rate (%) 0.08 0.09 0.24
   Total financial vaccine cost (US$) 9.58 8.93 4.16
   VSL (US$) 4,172 4,730 12,129
Net benefits: WTP+avoided public COI
   Total financial vaccine cost (US$) 2.66 3.18 2.46
   Per-capita WTP (US$) 0.38x 0.33x 0.44x
Because C0 and A0 have multiple age-groups, the break-even scalar is shown. A scalar below 1 means that 
the parameters could decrease and still break even (i.e. 0.66=66% less). A scalar of 5.6x means that the 
relevant parameters would need to increase 560% to break even. The total financial vaccine cost includes 
acquisition and delivery costs, not travel/time costs
COI=Cost-of-illness; VSL=Value-of-statistical-life; WTP=Willingness-to-pay
it could purchase, store, and deliver the vaccine 
for less than US$ 0.08 (an unrealistically low cost). 
None of the strategies would pass a social cost-ben-
efit test even if the typhoid Vi vaccines were 100% 
effective.
All three strategies without user-fees passed a so-
cial cost-benefit test using the VSL+COI net bene-
fit measure. If the parameters for incidence were 
11-27% of their base case values (Table 4), the 
strategies would still pass. For example, the strat-
egy C0 targeting all children would still pass if the 
incidence rates among young children and school 
children were 0.41 and 0.59 cases per 1,000 respec-
tively. Similarly, CFRs could be much lower than 
1% (0.09% for strategy C0) and still pass. Estimates 
of the value of a statistical life could also be much 
lower than our estimate of US$ 50,000 and still 
pass using this measure. Similarly, average vaccine 
costs could be as high as US$ 8-9, and the strategies 
targeting children would still pass. Likewise, since 
all three strategies produced net benefits using the 
WTP measure, average vaccine costs could be high-
er (US$ 2-3) or average WTP could be lower than 
we assumed in the base case scenario and still pass a 
social cost-benefit test.
We next allowed several uncertain parameters to 
vary simultaneously in a Monte Carlo framework. Cook J et al. Typhoid vaccination in Kolkata
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Avoided COI net benefits were negative for all 
three strategies in all 10,000 model runs (Table 5). 
All three typhoid-vaccination strategies in Tiljala 
would certainly fail a social cost-benefit test if the 
benefits are restricted to avoided treatment costs. 
However, the model predicts that all three strate-
gies have a high probability of producing positive 
net benefits using either the ‘VSL+avoided COI’ or 
‘WTP+avoided public COI’ net benefit measures. 
The large discrepancy in mean net benefits between 
these latter two measures was largely driven by the 
CFR parameter. The VSL+COI estimates were high-
ly sensitive to this parameter, which we assumed 
could reach as high as 3%. For C0A0, for example, 
if we changed only the CFR from 1% to 2% and 
kept all other parameters at their mean values, the 
VSL+avoided COI net benefits jumped from US$ 
277,531 to US$ 643,947. Increasing the CFR to 
3% increased the net benefits to US$ 1.01 million.     
Monte Carlo simulations on the cost-effectiveness 
ratios are provided in Cook et al. (14).
DISCUSSION
Limitations
There are several caveats to our analysis. First, we 
did not incorporate indirect (herd) protection. Re-
sults of a cluster-randomized trial of the Vi vaccine 
in Kolkata indicate that unvaccinated neighbours 
and children do receive some indirect protection 
(20). This could significantly improve both our 
cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit results.
Table 5. Monte Carlo simulations of typhoid-vaccination strategies with no user-fees
Benefit measures
S0
School-age children               
(5-14.9 years)
C0
All eligible children 
(2-15 years)
C0A0
Adults plus all  
eligible children
Avoided COI net benefits 
   Median   (17,817) (34,125) (137,013)
   95% confidence interval (34,435)-(8,474) (63,949)-(17,142) (241,713)- (77,081)
   % positive 0 0 0
VSL+avoided COI net benefits
   Median 167,068 293,450 415,462
   95% confidence interval 55,513-405,775 118,329-647,427 141,395-835,950
   % positive >99 >99 >99
WTP+avoided public COI net benefits
  Median 14,097 39,241 73,238
  95% confidence interval (2,213)-26,274 9,159-61,049 (29,944)-143,710
  % positive 95 >99 90
All currency values are in US$ as of 2007, translated from local currency using market exchange rates;
COI=Cost-of-illness; VSL=Value-of-statistical-life; WTP=Willingness-to-pay 
Second, antibiotic resistance to treatment could 
increase treatment costs. The surveillance study in 
Kolkata measured resistance to seven antibiotics, 
including ampicillin, co-trimoxizole also known as 
TMP-SMZ, and chloramphenocol. Although public 
costs were, in fact, higher for drug-resistant cases 
compared to drug-sensitive cases, the difference was 
not statistically significant [Poulos C et al. Cost of 
illness due to typhoid fever in five Asian countries. 
2008. (Unpublished working paper)], and we do 
not distinguish between these two types of cases.
Third, because of extensive training and public-
awareness campaigns that accompanied the 
surveillance studies, there was an increased aware-
ness of the disease among both service providers 
and patients. Along with the establishment of a 
community-based clinic in the Kolkata study site, 
this meant that febrile patients most likely sought 
treatment more often and earlier than they nor-
mally would do. This probably resulted in fewer 
severe complications, such as splenic rupture (In 
fact, no splenic ruptures were reported during the 
surveillance period). This would make the public 
and private COI observed too low. The availability 
of over-the-counter antibiotics also raises the pos-
sibility that some patients may have self-medicated 
before seeking treatment, again lowering public 
treatment costs though not privately-borne costs 
(19). 
Fourth, we use a one-period model that only exam-
ines costs and benefits over the period that the vac-Cook J et al. Typhoid vaccination in Kolkata
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cine would be effective (three years). Vaccination 
would, of course, have to re-occur every three years 
to maintain protection in the population.
Implications for policy and financing
We return to the three key economic policy ques-
tions. First, would a programme or strategy that 
provided Vi vaccines free of charge in Tiljala and 
Narkeldanga pass a social cost-benefit test? Using 
a definition that restricts economic benefits to 
treatment costs avoided, we found that none of 
the vaccination strategies would pass a social cost-
benefit test. However, we believe that this avoided 
COI measure misses important components 
of economic benefits, such as reducing mortality 
risk and pain and suffering. Measures that account 
for these, using either a VSL or a stated prefer-
ence approach, indicate that all three programmes 
would produce net economic benefits. These latter 
two measures, however, are not widely accepted by 
health policy analysts. Although we found that the 
cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit (using the latter 
two definitions) approaches gave similar results in 
our study site, we would note that the two method-
ologies may not always give the same ranking for 
allocation of a limited public-sector budget. This is 
because household preferences are not well-reflect-
ed in cost-effectiveness ratios.
Second, would the vaccination strategy be a wise 
use of limited public-health resources in India? 
One approach for using cost-effectiveness results 
is to compare them against set cut-off points. One 
commonly-used metric first used by the World 
Bank (31) compares CE ratios with per-capita GDP. 
A strategy with a ratio less than three times per-
capita GDP is ‘cost-effective’, and one with a ratio 
less than per-capita GDP is ‘very cost-effective’. By 
these definitions, all  three strategies would be con-
sidered ‘very cost-effective’. Both strategies target-
ing children have 95% confidence intervals below 
US$ 871 (14), and the strategy targeting adults and 
children was below US$ 871 in 85% of the Monte 
Carlo simulations.
Cost-effectiveness analysis is more useful, however, 
when numerous interventions can be directly com-
pared. The Disease Control Priorities Project is a re-
cent attempt which builds on previous global dis-
ease-burden studies by compiling a comprehensive 
list of health interventions for developing countries 
and reporting the range of cost-effectiveness ratios 
in the literature (32,33). Health policy-makers may 
then use this cost-effectiveness information to set 
priorities among competing health projects. 
How do typhoid fever-vaccination strategies in 
slums in Kolkata fare compared to other interven-
tions? Although all three strategies have attractive 
cost-effectiveness ratios, several other ‘neglected 
low-cost opportunities’ for South Asia have CE ratios 
that are generally below all three Kolkata Vi strate-
gies, including: expanding the existing EPI coverage 
[(US$ 8 per DALY averted; India’s most recently-
reported coverage for measles, and DTP3 immu-
nization was 59% (34)], HIV/AIDS interventions 
(US$ 9-126 per DALY), and tuberculosis vaccination 
and control (US$ 8-263 per DALY) (33). Typhoid 
vaccination in slums might still be a good public 
investment in the longer term, with growing per-
capita incomes, rising public spending on health, 
and achievement of higher-priority health goals in 
all the Indian states (i.e. near-universal EPI access).
Finally, is a financially self-sufficient vaccination 
programme in these two slums practically possible? 
According to the most recently-published national 
health accounts data for India (2001-2002), total 
health-related spending nationwide was Rs 1,021 
per person (35). Using Indian inflation rates and 
current exchange rates, we estimate that total per-
capita health expenditure was about US$ 32 per 
year in 2007. Of this total, though approximately 
77% is private health spending, one of the high-
est percentages in the world (34,36,37). On a per-
capita basis, public-sector spending is only about Rs 
207 (US$ 6.60 in 2007), among the lowest rates of 
public spending on health in Asia (around 1.1% of 
GDP).  
The Government of India is in the midst of an ini-
tiative (the National Rural Health Mission) to in-
crease public spending on health in rural, ‘disad-
vantaged’ states (36). One goal of the programme 
is to double or triple public spending on health (to 
2-3% of GDP) from 2005 to 2012. Because of the 
programme’s rural focus, however, large urban ar-
eas, such as Kolkata, may not see large increases in 
public-sector health spending. Furthermore, most 
public spending on health in India occurs at the 
state level (35), and we know of no current initia-
tives in the state of West Bengal to dramatically ex-
pand public-sector health financing.
As in most countries, the Government of India 
has not asked users to share the cost of immuniza-
tions; vaccines in the Government’s EPI have been 
provided free of charge. Some non-EPI vaccines, 
however, are available for sale in the private market 
(33). One example is the typhoid Vi polysaccharide 
vaccine, although the private market is very small 
and most people are unaware of its availability. In Cook J et al. Typhoid vaccination in Kolkata
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Kolkata, for example, it is available for purchase in 
a small number of private physician’s offices, and 
sales are low. The limited demand we observed in 
2004 was principally for young people in wealthier 
families who needed the vaccine for travel abroad 
or for school enrollment. At a financial cost of about 
US$ 1.07 per vaccinated person, any of the typhoid-
vaccination strategies would absorb approximately 
one-sixth of the current per-capita public health-
related spending in India. As a percentage of total 
health-related spending by the state or national 
government, however, a strategy of vaccinating 
people in only a few low-income, high-incidence 
slums in major Indian cities would not necessarily 
pose a large financial burden. It would essentially 
reflect a redistribution of health subsidies from 
more well-off urban households and poorer rural 
households to the poorest urban sub-populations. 
Furthermore, we do not discount the argument that 
India should increase public spending on health 
and decrease reliance on private spending. Typhoid 
Vi vaccination in high-incidence slums would seem 
to be a worthwhile use of that expanded funding, 
especially targeting only school-age children who 
have the highest incidence.   
However, the state and federal governments may 
place a higher priority on implementing other 
health interventions with the limited, and even ex-
panded, health funding available to them. Vaccines 
could, of course, be purchased by external donors 
rather than by the local or national government. 
Many of these donors, such as GAVI, see their role, 
however, as providing short- to medium-term lev-
eraging of the existing resources and catalyzing 
change and innovation rather than simply procur-
ing vaccines over the long term (>10 years). They 
may also wish to target their assistance to only 
those programmes with the most favourable cost-
effectiveness ratios.
If neither government nor donor support can be 
marshalled for long-term provision of free Vi vac-
cines—or indeed, any of the competing new-gener-
ation vaccines—into such slums, the Government 
may consider subsidizing some portion of the cost 
of vaccines but ask the vaccinated to contribute a 
share of the costs. Some observers may have ethical 
objections to levying user-fees among a poor and 
perhaps politically-marginalized sub-population, 
some of whom may be unable to afford the fees. 
However, if a government (a) decides that user-fees 
for vaccines are unacceptable, (b) decides that a 
vaccine is not attractive enough to include in the 
national (free) vaccination programme, and (c) pre-
vents the private sector from selling the vaccine at 
marginal cost (which many developing countries 
do), many more people are denied access to the 
vaccine, and the poor, politically-marginalized sub-
population will still go unvaccinated. 
Figure 1 shows the frontier of possible user-charges 
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Fig. 1. Frontier of programmatic possibilities for a community-based campaign targeting all age-groupsCook J et al. Typhoid vaccination in Kolkata
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(and implied public subsidies) and their impact 
on public revenue required (the y-axis on the left) 
and cases avoided in the two slums (the y-axis on 
the right). The solid lines show the possibilities for 
implementing a uniform user-charge, i.e. adults 
and children pay the same fee. This type of strat-
egy would be revenue-neutral at a fee of US$ 1.03, 
just less than the full marginal financial cost of US$ 
1.07 because of public COI savings. It would result 
in 178 fewer cases than a strategy where vaccines 
are given free of charge to all age-groups (C0A0 in 
Table 3). Figure 2 similarly portrays the trade-off be-
tween different strategies, with this revenue-neutral 
strategy labelled C1.03A1.03 (again, superscripts de-
note the user-fees asked of each group).
A second option would be to provide vaccines free 
of charge to children but to charge adults the full 
marginal cost (net of expected public COI savings). 
This strategy (labelled C0A1.03 in Fig. 2) would have 
a net public cost of US$ 26,275 and prevent 679 
typhoid cases, only 75 cases fewer than the strategy 
C0A0 without user-fees).  
Lauria et al. analyzed a cross-subsidy scheme in 
which adults were charged prices greater than full 
marginal cost to subsidize vaccines for children 
(38). The dashed lines in Figure 1 shows how cases 
avoided and net public costs change with possible 
adult user-fees if such a cross-subsidy scheme were 
Fig. 2. Comparison of ﬁnancing strategies for typhoid Vi vaccination in two slums in Kolkata
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used in our study sites and children were vaccinated 
free of charge. In our example, for this cross-subsidy 
scheme to be revenue-neutral, adults would need 
to be charged a fee of US$ 1.68 to cross-subsidize 
free vaccines for children (C0A1.68). We predict 
that this would prevent 642 cases (113 fewer than 
C0A0) and require no new public-sector financial 
resources. 
It is worth noting three caveats to this financing ap-
proach. First, savings from public-sector treatment 
costs may not be easy to convert into cash to fund 
vaccination programmes. Second, we have assumed 
that policy-makers would consider public COI sav-
ings in their calculation of revenue-neutrality but 
they may not.  Finally, it is possible that even our 
most conservative demand estimates from the con-
tingent valuation study are too high, and demand 
for adults may not materialize. If this were the case, 
revenues from adults would not be sufficient to 
cross-subsidize the cost of running the programme 
for children. The financial risk to the Government 
of adult demand not materializing is about US$ 
26,000. To maintain revenue-neutrality, user-fees for 
adults would then have to be increased (or user-fees 
for children introduced), both of which might be 
difficult to implement.
To account for this risk, the Government could ini-Cook J et al. Typhoid vaccination in Kolkata
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tially charge adults a fee somewhat larger than the 
expected revenue-neutral price of US$ 1.68 (perhaps 
US$ 2.00) and charge a small fee for child vaccina-
tions (US$ 0.25). This strategy (labelled C0.25A2.00 in 
Fig. 2) would, of course, generate excess revenues if 
our demand estimates are correct (it lies to the left 
of the revenue-neutral line in Fig. 2). After distrib-
uting vaccines with this pricing structure for three 
years, the Government could assess whether actual 
demand is similar to our predictions and whether 
public COI savings are as expected. If so, it could 
then reduce the price for adults and move the price 
for children towards zero (depicted with an arrow 
in Fig. 2). Again, accounting for the effects of indi-
rect herd protection would show even larger reduc-
tions in cases and deaths avoided while still main-
taining revenue-neutrality.
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